12 September 2025, 19:52

Astana. September 12. KazTAG – Yaroslav Razumov. Four years ago, on the last day of summer, the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. The date is not a round one, but there was an informational reason to look at this country – not long before it, the Taliban government called on China, Russia and the United States to compete with each other in Afghanistan not militarily, but with investment projects. In today’s international context, any joint mention of the three countries cannot fail to attract attention. Especially when it comes from a country that has been the object of geopolitical competition for many years. We are talking about this and today’s Afghanistan with the famous political scientist, candidate of philosophical sciences, Rustam Burnashev.

– Rustam, the statement is unexpected. Is there any intrigue in it? Is this not a veiled way to pit external players against each other? Or is the economy in Afghanistan really bad? And another question: the appeal was made, in particular, to the US, does that mean the Taliban have no claims against them, despite the intervention and military actions?

– No, there is nothing unexpected in this appeal, it is a normal position. All countries are looking for foreign investment. The countries of Central Asia, for example. The only question is the conditions for providing them. As for the USA. The Taliban movement and the government it created are not something homogeneous. During the presence of their armed forces in Afghanistan, US representatives negotiated with individual Taliban groups. There was a certain contractual basis. It is obvious that the USA is not perceived by them today as a global “evil empire”. After the Americans left Afghanistan, the issue is moving towards normal constructive interaction between them and the Taliban.

– Russia, as is known, officially recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in July of this year. Why, in your opinion, do not the Central Asian countries, Afghanistan’s closest neighbors, take such steps? It would seem that if there is such a precedent created by Moscow, then this can be expected, since Kabul has always irritated the Central Asian authorities, and so – we can start “building bridges.”

– Here we must clearly distinguish between de facto and de jure. De facto, all Central Asian countries, even Tajikistan, are currently interacting with Afghanistan at one level or another. We have delegations from there that represent the government formed by the Taliban movement. In this regard, we de facto recognize them as a force that controls Afghanistan and with which we are building relations. From my point of view, there are no problems here. Moreover, the position regarding the movement has been softened quite seriously; many Central Asian countries that included the Taliban in the list of terrorist organizations have removed it from there. That is, a legal basis has emerged for interaction with the government they created.

De jure, the issue is more complex. The countries of the region are obviously oriented not only towards Russia, and as sovereign states, they should not follow in its wake. The common international position on the recognition of the Afghan government created by the Taliban movement is also important to us. And within its framework, some ideological guidelines of a liberal nature were initially voiced. In particular, regarding the so-called inclusive government. That is, one that would include the majority of ethnic and ideological groups represented in the country, and would soften a number of ideological guidelines on which the Taliban movement is based, for example, those concerning the status of women. It is clear that our countries supported these demands, but they are not being met in Afghanistan, and as long as they are present at the international level, our countries will not change anything de jure. Moreover, from a pragmatic point of view, this means practically nothing for our cooperation.

– How do you see the prospects of this situation?

– Since the Taliban movement does not abandon its positions on these issues, and the very version of Islamic ideology that is fundamental to them does not imply such a refusal, then there will be no legal recognition of the Taliban government in the foreseeable future. But, on the other hand, I repeat, it is not mandatory, since it does not interfere with our format of cooperation.

– The Kazakh authorities, under almost all political regimes in Kabul, declared their interest in broad economic cooperation with Afghanistan. But it never reached any large-scale level: the total volume of trade in 2024 was $ 545.2 million, with a downward trend. Is this due to political instability in Afghanistan, or is the story objective, based on the economic potential of this country?

– These are interconnected positions. If there was long-term instability in the country, there were military actions, purchasing power was extremely low for a long time, then there are natural limitations for economic cooperation. They were, and partly still are. That is why cooperation projects arise in the infrastructure sector, or in energy supplies – they should contribute to the development of the country’s economy, stabilize the situation there and make Afghanistan, albeit a limited, but promising market. Some restrictions will still remain, it is difficult to imagine that in the medium term Afghanistan will become comparable in purchasing power to Kazakhstan. It is clear that in this regard, its capabilities are limited. As well as from the point of production: the goods that Afghanistan can offer represent limited segments. These are agricultural products, their processing, jewelry, carpets. It is clear that our demand for this is limited. But we see a similar picture with our regional neighbors, they are also not Kazakhstan’s main partners. The reasons are the same as with Afghanistan, with the exception of instability: this is a limited market and product positions.

– For many years, the idea has been that if Afghanistan is pacified, it could become an effective transport corridor to the large markets of India, Pakistan, and through it to the open seas for the countries of Central Asia. Has this concept become more realistic over the past four years?

– This concept has existed since the 1990s, and it remains. But it has never been considered as a potential main foreign trade route, either in terms of capacity or in terms of overall security. It was considered an interesting additional one. For example, for Kazakhstan it is obvious that the East-West route, despite all the events around it recently, will remain fundamental. But there is interest in the southern direction, this year Kazakhstan declared its readiness to invest in the southern route, Uzbekistan is at the stage of developing a feasibility study for the route through Kabul to Pakistan.

Now the logic of attitudes towards such projects has changed. Previously it was like this: “first Afghanistan is pacified, then we build these routes”, now these are considered as interconnected processes. That is, normalization of the situation in the country is not a condition for economic projects, but a parallel process. The creation of economic projects will create conditions for normalization of the situation in Afghanistan.

– In the 1990s and 2000s, when a “Second Kuwait” was expected on the Kazakh part of the Caspian shelf, the so-called “southern direction” through Afghanistan was discussed among potential oil export routes. As is known, “Kuwait” did not happen, but there is oil, and it needs access to foreign markets. But there are problems with the traditional route. Can anyone recall the “southern corridor” in this context?

– This is not my segment, but I think that, as in the previous question, this direction can only be considered as additional. We see that, even in the conditions of military actions and sanctions imposed on Russia, Western companies use the CPC as the main channel for oil exports. It is difficult for me to imagine that, even despite the known difficulties, this channel would cease to be used. In order for the Afghan direction to be noticed as potentially significant for export, large additional volumes of hydrocarbon raw materials are needed, which the pipelines that currently exist would not cope with, which China would not absorb. But this is difficult to imagine. And this route will in any case be very expensive, including due to security issues. After all, Afghanistan remains a risky country for the implementation of any infrastructure projects.

– Four years ago, when it became finally clear that the Americans were leaving Afghanistan, the world media showed footage of people falling from planes, everyone was sure that the country was on the threshold of a new wave of mass terror. But today, perhaps, we can say that this did not happen. Can we say today that these fears can be finally pushed aside? Has the Taliban regime turned out to be not so terrible?

– At that time, several possible scenarios were considered after the Taliban came to Kabul. This was only one of them, there were others, softer ones. Why is there a set of ideological demands that are made on the Taliban movement? It does not just appear out of thin air. There is a fairly serious deterioration in the situation of women by Western standards in terms of freedom of movement, access to education, and employment. Yes, there are no mass reprisals against opponents of the Taliban, but there are reprisals, punishments, and the use of harsh Sharia practices. There are measures in the sphere of cultural policy that can be explained based on the ideology of the movement, but from the point of view of our countries, they look strange. For example, the recent demolition of the Navoi monument. From the point of view of building partnerships with neighbors, this looks specific. The harshest scenario after the Taliban came, indeed, did not materialize, but there is a relatively soft form of pressure on society.

– The ethnic factor has always played an important role in Afghan politics. The names Dostum and Massoud are memorable. Now nothing is heard about this. Why? Have the Taliban managed to suppress separatist and autonomist movements, or is it simply “the way it is” now?

– Well, separatist attitudes have always been extremely weak there. Although, in my opinion, fragmentation remains. Based on the position of Tajikistan and external players, when it comes to the inclusiveness of the government, it is obvious that there is no proportional representation of all ethnic groups in power. This fragmentation could not go away: there is, at a minimum, a confrontation between urban and rural culture, where the former is traditionally mainly Dari-speaking, and the latter is Pashto-speaking. This could not disappear somewhere in four years, internal contradictions exist, but, apparently, due to fatigue from the war, they have now been suppressed. Perhaps, serious resources are also being spent to prevent a major split.

– Afghanistan’s entry into the process of dividing Central Asia’s water resources by building the Kosh-Tepa Canal has caused a lot of concern in the countries of the region, even in relatively remote Kazakhstan. Concerns are being expressed about the very fact of its construction, and the fact that it is allegedly being built poorly, with large losses of water…

– The contractual basis allows the Afghan authorities to take water from the Amu Darya basin, and they will increase it: with the stabilization of the situation in the country, they will need more and more resources for the development of agriculture and industry. The more effectively they use it, the better for everyone – after all, if the canal is built poorly and there are large losses of water, then its withdrawal will be large, the needs will not go away. This means that we need to agree on how we will build the process of water distribution, within what quotas and volumes, how it will be controlled. Sooner or later, these issues will be considered at the multilateral level. At the bilateral level, Uzbekistan is doing this for now.

– The pacification of the military-political situation will probably lead to demographic growth in Afghanistan, which is already traditionally high. Plus, some of the emigrants are returning to the country. Does this mean that over time, water from the Amu Darya will be taken away quite noticeably on its southern shore?

– Of course, water intake will increase. The question is, I repeat, that we need to negotiate about this. The difficulty is that the Taliban government bases its agreements on Sharia, where the interpretation of the fairness of water intake is different from our traditional approaches. The negotiation process will be difficult.

– In our region, there were fears that if the Taliban win in Afghanistan, they will inevitably begin expansion into Central Asia. Now it is clear that these fears were unfounded. But if they are able to carry out effective reforms, ensure stable economic growth and a relatively fair distribution of public goods, won’t this regime become an example for someone in our countries, at least at the level of discussion? Like – “look what the Islamic movement did in Afghanistan: it pacified, ensured growth, and we have corruption, inflation, social stratification.”

– This is an extremely distant prospect. Like the talk that Uzbekistan will one day overtake Kazakhstan in GDP. It is very naive to assume that there is no corruption in Afghanistan. During the presence of the Americans there, it was off the charts. And I do not think that the Taliban movement has changed anything in this. Perhaps some people or forces can invent a fantastic Afghanistan where “everything is fine,” but in reality, it will need many years to reach the level of even the weakest countries of Central Asia. Another thing is that, of course, there are people who will say: “look, there is a state that is built on an Islamic model, let’s do the same.” The idea of ​​building an Islamic state may arise, but without the idea that “Afghanistan is an example to follow in socio-economic development.” Rather, even such people can say that “our starting conditions are better.” The ideological vector has always been considered a dominant problem in our region by the Taliban movement. And this format will be present, especially since all the Islamic peoples of the region adhere to one madhhab. This should be stopped by our reforms, processes that reduce the negative processes that exist in our societies.

– The Taliban’s arrival in Kabul is the fourth change of power in the country, counting from the Najibullah government. Can we assume that this is now a long-term story? Or is it all a guess?

– Any forecast is a guess. But the situation of the last four years shows that the regime has been able to stabilize the risks that are present in Afghanistan. They have not disappeared, but they have been mitigated. External factors have changed, large countries are quite neutral towards Afghanistan, there are no longer any attempts to introduce any elements of the “Great Game” into it, on the contrary, they are offering it real economic projects… And in this regard, we can talk about an optimistic format, at least for the medium term.

– Thank you for the interview!

Google machine translated

Photo source: Photo from open sources